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The Pivotal State: Post-Apartheid South Africa
EDWIN S. COCHRAN

From Parameters, Winter 2000-01, pp. 83-101.

In April 1999 Thabo Mbeki became the second democratically elected President of the Republic of South Africa.
Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela, whose own election in 1994 marked the climax of the most important political
transition in the history of modern Africa. For his countrymen, the majority of whom were voting for the first time,
Mandela's election signified the end of 46 years of white minority rule under South Africa's increasingly oppressive
apartheid government.
Instituted by the South African Nationalist Party in 1948, apartheid ("separateness") sought the "separate development"
of South Africa's races. Apartheid provided the policy framework for the maintenance of minority rule through the
institutionalized social, economic, political, and legal segregation of South African whites, blacks, Indians, and
"Coloreds" (people of mixed race). Prior to Mandela's election, internal resistance to apartheid had driven South Africa
to the brink of civil war, and regional and international opposition to South Africa's racial policies had left the country
a pariah state, largely isolated from the rest of the international community.
Since the end of apartheid South Africa has made significant progress toward overcoming the legacy of this politically
and economically fragile race-based system which denied full rights to the majority of its people. Six years after
Mandela's election, South Africa is by far the most advanced democracy in Africa. The end of apartheid also has
allowed South Africa to end its previous international isolation. The country's new government aspires to both a
position of regional political leadership and one of influence in international organizations. South Africa also has
emerged as one of Africa's leading trading nations and a key center of foreign, including US, investment in the region.
South Africa's economy alone accounts for 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's total gross domestic product (GDP).
Excluding oil imports, South Africa accounts for 60 percent of US trade with Africa and one-quarter of US capital
investment in the region.[1]
South Africa's demonstrated commitment to democratic governance and peaceful political change and its level of
industrial and economic development in comparison to other African states, along with its military capabilities, mark it
as Sub-Saharan Africa's "pivotal state." A pivotal state is one which is:
so important that its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration, communal violence,
pollution, disease, and so on. A pivotal state's steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand,
would bolster [its] region's economic vitality and political soundness and benefit American trade and
investment.[2]
South Africa's emergence as Sub-Saharan Africa's pivotal state is of strategic importance for the United States. During
its tenure the Clinton Administration has made an unprecedented effort to foster engagement with the nations of SubSaharan Africa, a region that has traditionally been of only peripheral strategic interest to the United States. "For too
much of this century," President Clinton said, "the relationship between the United States and Africa was plagued by
indifference on our part."[3] One aim of President Clinton's March 1998 visit to Sub-Saharan African was "to persuade
an American audience with few notions of the continent that Africa not only exists, but matters."[4]
The broad outlines of a new US policy approach to Africa began to emerge in May 1993 when, in a speech to the
African-American Institute, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the United States sought a "new
relationship with Africa." Unlike during the Cold War, when US "policies toward Africa were . . . determined not by
how they affected Africa, but whether [they] brought advantage or disadvantage to Washington or Moscow," American
relations with African states would now be "based upon our common interests and shared values." The United States,

said Christopher, "will provide strong and visible support for the movement to freedom in Africa." It would also "work
with the nations of Africa to address the health, economic, and population issues that threaten lives and imperil
sustainable development." Finally, said Christopher, the United States would also "help Africa build its capacity for
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.[5]
In the years since Christopher's speech, American policymakers have continued to refine US policy objectives in
Africa. The 1999 National Security Strategy states that the overall objective of US Africa policy is "to increase the
number of capable states in Africa; that is nations that are able to define the challenges they face, manage their
resources to effectively address those challenges, and build stability and peace within their borders and subregions."[6]
A review of the National Security Strategy, along with the contents of other policy documents and statements by US
policymakers, provides the following list of subsidiary political, economic, and security objectives of US policy in
Africa:

• Support for the growth and development of democratic governance in the region. "In Africa as elsewhere," states the
National Security Strategy, "democracies [have] proved stronger partners for peace, stability, and sustained
prosperity." In contrast to the Cold War, when support for specific African rulers constituted part of a larger global
contest, the State Department's U.S. Strategy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa states that US policy now "focuses
on supporting broadly democratic processes and institutions, not personalities or specific political outcomes." In
keeping with its core objective of increasing the number of "capable" African states, the United States seeks the
development of "stable, functioning democratic governments" in Africa that are "able to represent the wishes of their
citizens" and which can serve as "responsible partners in solving pressing global problems."[7]

• Sustainable economic development and Africa's full integration into the global economy. The White House
Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa declares that economic growth in Africa is
"manifestly in the US national interest." Stronger African economies will contribute to regional social and political
stability, as well as create more export opportunities for US goods and services. Economic growth in Africa is also
expected to "reduce costs to the US of emergency humanitarian assistance as [African] countries become better
equipped to manage their own emergencies."[8]

• Reform of African economies and greater opportunities for US trade and investment. The National Security Strategy
describes Africa as one of the world's "largest basically untapped markets." The United States enjoys only a oneseventh market share in Africa. Although exports to the region account for only one percent of US foreign trade, these
support an estimated 100,000 American jobs. In June 1996 President Clinton announced the creation of the Partnership
for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa, whose purpose is to "spur African nations to implement significant
market reforms" in order to achieve sustainable growth and development. By supporting African economic reform
efforts, the partnership seeks to create opportunities for US companies to trade with and invest in Africa, create jobs,
and further "mutual prosperity."[9]

• Maintenance of regional stability through the development of indigenous conflict management mechanisms and
peacekeeping forces. The US Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa states that conflict resolution and peaceful
change in Africa:
are primary US goals since the degree of success in achieving them is the basis of progress in all other
areas. The United States actively supports the nascent efforts of African nations to take the lead in
resolving conflicts and peacekeeping efforts in the region. However, it is also willing to play the role of
catalyst, technical advisor, and honest broker to resolve conflicts.[10]
Since 1996 the United States has sponsored the African Crisis Response Initiative to work with African armed forces
to enhance their capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Training
emphasizes communications, leadership, and basic military skills, and is geared toward helping African units achieve

United Nations standards for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief practices. By 1999 units from Senegal, Ghana,
Uganda, Malawi, Mali, and Benin had received ACRI training, and ACRI-trained units have participated in
peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central Africa Republic.
In 1998 the United States established the African Center for Strategic Studies, a senior-level program for African
civilian and military leaders. This center is intended to provide both academic training and to serve as forum for
engaging African military leaders in a substantive dialogue on policy planning, civil-military relations, and defense
resource management in democracies.[11]

• Eradication or containment of a broad range of transnational threats emanating from Africa. These include statesponsored terrorism, international crime and narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, infectious diseases
(particularly HIV/AIDS), and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[12]
Sub-Saharan Africa: The Strategic Environment
The strategic environment in which the United States seeks to achieve these policy objectives is complex, challenging,
and offers only limited opportunities for productive engagement. Sub-Saharan Africa, 48 states with 600 million
people who speak a thousand different languages, is one of the most fragmented regions in the world. Politically, most
African states are the products of European colonialism, which began with the Portuguese voyages of discovery during
the 15th century and reached its zenith in the "scramble for Africa" during the late 19th century. Africa continues to
bear the burden of its colonial past.
European colonial boundaries in Africa were often arbitrarily imposed without regard for ethnic composition, and
hardly anywhere did these boundaries coincide with the territorial limits of indigenous population groups. This process
of colonial apportionment effectively destroyed Africa's previously existing ethnically based political institutions.
Today, Africa has an externally imposed, artificial state system that does not reflect the region's ethnic realities. Most
European colonies in Africa also were demarcated based on the assumption that they would not become independent
states. The small size and limited resources of many states formed in this manner continue to discourage both effective
production and foreign investment.[13]
European colonial rule, which typically combined the centralization of political and economic power with the
suppression of indigenous political expression or dissent, left African colonies unequipped for democratic governance
when most received their independence in the 1960s. Further, these emerged into the bipolar international system of
the Cold War in which competition between the United States and the Soviet Union produced aid and, to a limited
extent, influence for new African states. As long as they were supported by one of the two superpowers, actual
methods of governance were of little consequence.[14] Not surprisingly, post-independence political regimes emerged
across Africa under the personal rule of "big men," and characterized by widespread ethnic favoritism and nepotism,
corruption, and abuse of human rights. Most of these new African governments also adopted "statist" economic
systems based on high levels of protectionism and public ownership.
During the early 1990s, changes in the international and regional political climate appeared to be supportive of
democratization in Africa. These included the end of the Cold War, the demise of apartheid in South Africa, and the
determination of many Western governments to link developmental aid to political and economic reforms. The "big
men" who had ruled most African states since independence were now perceived as being replaced by a new
generation of leaders more favorably disposed toward democracy and capitalism.[15]
Since 1990, elections have taken place in 40 African states. In addition to South Africa, there have been peaceful
governmental transitions in Namibia, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Mali, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi,
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal. Despite much rhetoric concerning the apparent "wave of democratic revolutions
sweeping Africa," however, democratic reform in the region has in fact had mixed results and faces an uncertain
future. Opposition parties and political leaders in many African countries maintain that the practice of multiparty
politics is a sham, largely devised to placate Western donors who now impose political conditions on aid. Analysis of
election results in African countries during the past decade suggests that most have served to confirm the power of
already entrenched rulers, many of which originally came to power through military coups.[16] In addition, civil wars

(in Angola in 1992 and Congo in 1997) or military coups (in Burundi and Sierra Leone in 1996, and in Cote d'Ivoire
in 1999) have invalidated the results of at least five African elections during the past decade.
Attempts to introduce Western-style democracy in African countries have created problems for both voters and
political leaders with no experience in operating in open and competitive political systems. The "excessive emphasis"
on voting in particular is based on false assumptions concerning the nature of African political institutions. Voters in
most African countries are far more likely to cast their votes based on cues from village "big men" or ethnic brokers,
rather than on a government's performance.[17] Most African political leaders, meanwhile, "remain extremely
suspicious of popular participation and even more so of party politics."[18] Some, such as Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe, have instituted "single-party democracy" to justify their continued personal rule. This, combined with
Mugabe's declared intention to confiscate and redistribute white-owned farms, brings into further question the nature of
democratic governance and rule of law in Zimbabwe. Yoweri Musenveni, who considers multiparty democracy to be
"unacceptably confrontational and divisive," has instituted a "no-party system" in Uganda.[19]
The economic policies adopted by most African states at independence have since failed to deliver sustained increases
in prosperity. Levels of capital investment and manufacturing remain low, and transportation and communications
infrastructures in Africa, most of which date from the colonial era, are poorly developed. Poor management and heavy
borrowing have left many African states with external debts larger than their annual GDPs. Meanwhile, economic
growth rates in Africa slowed progressively from 4.7 percent in 1996 to less than 2.5 percent in 1998-99, and are
expected to achieve only 3.3 percent over 2000-01 under the most favorable conditions.[20]
Africa's role in the global economy is primarily that of a producer of raw materials for industrialized nations. The
economies of most African nations are dependent on agriculture and extractive industries, particularly oil and mining,
and Africa's annual $65 billion in exports consists primarily of raw materials. Africa produces up to 45 percent of the
world supply of such major mineral commodities as chromite, cobalt, diamonds, gold, manganese ore, crude
petroleum, phosphate, and uranium. For most African states, their strongest economic ties remain to former colonial
metropoles, for whom they remain sources of inexpensive raw materials and virtually guaranteed export markets for
manufactured goods. Former French colonies, in particular, continue to serve as major outlets for French trade,
investment, and employment. Africa is France's third largest export market, after Europe and North America, and a
critical source of raw materials for French industry. US economic relations with Africa also reflect the continent's
global role as a source of raw materials. The United States obtains 14 percent of its crude oil imports from African
sources. Nigeria is the fifth leading US oil supplier, with Angola, Gabon, and Niger among the top 20 suppliers of
crude oil for the United States. Most of the $10 billion US annual trade deficit with Africa accrues to oil-producing
states. Largely dependent on the export of raw materials, the economic well-being of most African states is now
dependent on fluctuating world market prices and foreign aid.[21]
This combination of weak, authoritarian governments and fragile national economies produces social conditions in
Africa--war, poverty, hunger, environmental degradation, and disease--worse than those in other developing areas. Let
us look briefly at each of these characteristics.
Africa has more wars than any other continent. These include large-scale wars with more than 1,000 battle deaths per
year in Angola, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia,
and Sudan. To these are added low-intensity but no less brutal conflicts in Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Uganda. Several other countries are experiencing internal instability that could erupt into greater sectarian
violence. Nigeria, for instance, suffers from widespread corruption and economic inefficiency, as well as deeply rooted
ethnic and political conflicts that threaten its continued existence as a unitary state.[22]
The nature of Africa's wars, many of which are rooted in ethnic conflicts reflecting the artificial nature of the African
state system, and the personal rule exercised by many African political leaders hamper the development of effective
conflict management institutions in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa lacks the bases upon which effective, voluntary
security cooperation has been founded in other parts of world. There is no clear distinction between "free" and
"unfree" nations, or between market-based or centrally planned economies, on which to premise an alliance or security
system. Nor is there a grass-roots base of informed citizens to support such a system. The character of most African
armed forces is also a complicating factor in the establishment of effective security systems. Few African nations have

military cultures that readily accept the supremacy of civilian or parliamentary authority.[23]
Poverty and hunger also cripple the continent. Africa's population is the poorest in the world. Africa contains 23 of the
world's poorest countries, and an estimated 290 million Africans exist on incomes of less than $1 per day. Population
growth relative to the limited resource base of African countries contributes to the persistence of poverty. Africa's
population, growing at an annual rate of three percent, could more than double to 1.2 billion by 2025. This high
population growth rate is likely to offset any reductions in poverty and will challenge the ability of African
governments to provide even minimal social services for their people. In many parts of Africa population growth has
outstripped food production. Average caloric intake in Africa is estimated at about 90 percent of the minimum required
to maintain health and economic productivity. Additionally, population pressure in many African states is exacerbated
by the influx of refugees from neighboring countries. Of the world's 22 million cross-border refugees, approximately
8.1 million are in Africa.[24]
Environmental degradation is also widespread throughout Africa, often as the result of reliance on extractive industries.
Deforestation, at a rate of about nine million acres per year, has had a particularly deleterious effect on African
ecosystems, destroying watersheds and further reducing limited water supplies. Unconstrained population growth and
rapid urbanization have also created air and water pollution, waste disposal, and sewage problems that are expected to
intensify. Until recently, one of the overlooked aspects of environmental degradation in Africa has been the effect of
large-scale use of landmines. An estimated 20 to 30 thousand landmines have been deployed in at least 18 African
states. These continue to kill at least 12 thousand people annually and injure thousands more. In addition to the human
costs, minefields also detract from development, particularly in rural areas where they make farmland unusable.[25]
Then there is the specter of disease. It is difficult to overstate the effects of disease in Africa. Of all the world's
population groups, Africans have the least chance of survival to the age of five. After that, the effects of malnutrition
and disease begin to take a toll. Life-threatening diseases endemic to Africa include HIV/AIDS, drug resistant strains
of tuberculosis and malaria, and otherwise normally preventable illnesses such as measles and infectious diarrhea
caused by typhoid and cholera. Africa is also the origin of so-called "hot zone" diseases such as the Ebola virus.[26]
The global AIDS epidemic, in particular, has had a devastating impact on Africa. "The numbers," writes Steven Metz,
"are simply numbing."[27] Africa accounts for two-thirds of the world's recorded AIDS cases. The UN estimates that
24.5 million Africans now have AIDS or the HIV virus. This means that one in 13 of all Africans between the ages of
15 and 49 will die of the disease. In 1999 alone, 2.2 million Africans died of AIDS, and Africa now has approximately
12.1 million AIDS orphans. In addition to the staggering human costs, AIDS contributes to the cycle of poverty in
Africa as survivors sell off assets, surviving children lose time in school to compensate for labor shortages, and the
amount of land under cultivation is reduced or simply abandoned. AIDS is also widespread throughout African military
and police forces, seriously degrading their effectiveness. In some African countries, three-quarters of the military
hospital beds are occupied by AIDS patients.[28]
South Africa: The Pivotal State
During the Cold War, US security strategy in Africa, as elsewhere, was driven by perceptions of the Soviet threat.
Soviet involvement in Africa was viewed as a threat to US economic and security interests in the region, usually
defined as access to strategic minerals and the security of the sea lines of communication around the Cape of Good
Hope. US relations with South Africa during this period reflected a conflicting amalgam of ideological and practical
concerns. Ideologically, South Africa's apartheid government was an embarrassment to the United States. Formally
committed to racial equality at home, the United States had an interest in the creation of a pro-Western, non-racial
democracy in South Africa. For the Soviets, apartheid represented a golden opportunity to advance their own interests
in Africa. Newly independent African states and liberation movements sought Soviet aid in their struggles against
minority rule not only in South Africa, but also in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola, and Mozambique. In order to offset
Soviet influence in Africa, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, and to safeguard its other interests in the region,
the United States afforded varying degrees of accommodation and cooperation to South Africa well into the 1980s.[29]
At the same time, beginning in the 1970s, aspects of US relations with South Africa began to be affected by the latter's
racial policies. By 1994 US relations with South Africa had become virtually one-dimensional, focused on the

oppression associated with apartheid. The United States had ceased consulting with South Africa on many issues, and
aspects of bilateral relations were allowed to lapse. American trade and investment with South Africa were
discouraged by sanctions, and the limited aid South Africa did receive from the United States was delivered only
through nongovernmental organizations.[30]
In a speech following Mandela's election in May 1994, President Clinton outlined the nature of US interests in postapartheid South Africa. "We have an economic interest in a thriving South Africa that will seek our exports and
generate prosperity in the region. We have a security interest in a stable, democratic South Africa working with its
neighbors to restore and secure peace." And, he said, the United States has a "clear moral interest" in the development
of democracy in South Africa. "I am convinced," said the President, " that South Africa can become a model for the
entire continent."[31]
In October 1994 President Clinton announced the formation of the US-South Africa Binational Commission.
Cochaired by the Vice Presidents of both countries, the Commission was established as "top-down approach intended
to restart a moribund relationship."[32] The commission has four broad objectives: to promote the US-South Africa
bilateral relationship "through a working partnership at the highest levels of government," to enhance bilateral
cooperation by "establishing permanent and vigorous institutional partnerships," to assist South Africa in meeting its
reconstruction and development goals, and to enhance the roles played by private investors and nongovernmental
organizations in strengthening relations between the two countries. The Binational Commission, which held its sixth
plenary meeting in February 1999, includes senior-level working committees for agriculture; conservation,
environment, and water; defense; human resource development and education; sustainable energy; and trade and
investment.[33]
In terms of both the African strategic environment and US policy toward Africa, South Africa is the pivotal state-politically, economically, and militarily.
The Political Dimension
The end of apartheid brought fundamental change to both South African domestic politics and foreign policy. The
country's new constitution, which took effect in February 1997, explicitly replaced the apartheid-era governing
principal of "parliamentary sovereignty" with that of the rule of law based on constitutional supremacy. The new
constitution also provided the framework for the creation of new, Western-style executive, legislative, and judicial
authorities at the national and provincial levels, and formally reincorporated the so-called "black homelands" into the
republic. The constitution's preamble defines its objective as "to heal the divisions of the past and establish a society
based on democratic values, social justice, and fundamental human rights" and to "lay the foundations for a democratic
and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by
law."[34]
The principal domestic task of South Africa's new government has been to remedy the long-term effects of apartheid,
which left the country with one of the most inequitable distributions of wealth in the world. While the white oneseventh of South Africa's population enjoy incomes, material comforts, and health and educational standards equal to
those of Western Europe, most of the population continues to endure living conditions comparable to those in the
Third World. High levels of crime also threaten the stability of South African society. The violence and pressures of
the anti-apartheid movement in the black townships produced almost an entire generation of young people who lack
basic education and job skills. In frustration, many have turned to crime as a means of support. Former guerrilla
fighters demobilized from the military wings of anti-apartheid groups and former personnel of the apartheid-era South
African armed forces also have been implicated in the activities of well-organized and extremely violent criminal
groups. South Africa's AIDS infection rate, already estimated at 11 percent, is expected to climb to 18 percent by
2005.[35]
The election that brought Mandela into office in 1994 also created a South African Government of National Unity with
the African National Congress (ANC) as its major party. For the majority of South Africans the ANC gained its
greatest claim to political legitimacy through its leading role in the struggle against apartheid. The primary challenge
for the ANC has been to transform itself from a liberation movement into an effective governing party. In the words of

one former ANC guerrilla, "People can't eat democracy. We desperately need food, hospitals, houses, land, education,
electricity, and water."[36] In 1995 South Africa initiated a multi-billion-dollar Reconstruction and Development
Program intended to ameliorate the effects of apartheid. Program objectives include poverty reduction and stimulation
of economic growth, human resource development, further democratization of the South African state and civil
society, and a broad range of urban and rural development efforts.[37]
Shortly before his election Mandela wrote that "charting . . . a new foreign policy for South Africa is a key element in
the creation of a peaceful and prosperous country."[38] Prior to 1949, the first full year of apartheid, both South
African and Western elites viewed South Africa as a Western state. After the apartheid regime took shape, Western
elites gradually excluded South Africa from the Western camp. South Africa's new government regards itself as both
nonaligned and distinctly African. In May 1994 South Africa became a member of both the 131-nation Non-Aligned
Movement and the Organization of African Unity.
South Africa now seeks to fulfill its "African destiny" by playing a leading role in the economic development and
integration of Southern Africa. "Southern Africa," wrote Mandela, "commands a special priority in our foreign policy.
We are inextricably part of Southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region which is much more than a
mere geographical concept." South African political leaders are bound to their neighbors by self-interest as well as a
sense of obligation for the support many of these states gave the ANC and other groups during their fight against
apartheid. In August 1994 South Africa joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC), promising to
provide "the highest possible degree of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where necessary, and joint planning
consistent with socio-economic, environmental, and political realities." [39]
South Africa's foreign policy also has a strongly internationalist orientation. "Peace," wrote Mandela, "it the goal for
which all nations should strive," and when peace breaks down "internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms . . .
must be employed" for its restoration. In a speech to the US Congress in October 1994, Mandela stated:
In an age such as this . . . much revision will have to be done of ideas that have seemed as stable as the
rocks, including such concepts as sovereignty and national interest. What we speak of is the evolution of
the objective world, which inexorably says to all of us that we are human together or nothing at all.
Equating global interdependence with international responsibility, he continued:
The world is one stage and the actions of its inhabitants part of the same drama. . . . [Therefore] each one
of us as nations . . . should begin to define the national interest to include the genuine happiness of others,
however distant in time and space their domiciles might be.[40]
In June 1994 South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth of Nations after an absence of 33 years and also resumed full
participation in the United Nations, where it has become a leading proponent of restructuring the Security Council in
order to afford greater representation to lesser-developed countries. South Africa has since played an active role in
regional conflict resolution efforts in the DRC, Angola, and Sudan, and South African armed forces have participated
in at least one exercise intended as preparation for peacekeeping tasks on the continent. South Africa's foreign policy
also includes a commitment to international nuclear nonproliferation and other arms control regimes. South Africa is
unique in that it is the only country to have developed and then voluntarily relinquished its nuclear weapons capability
before acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1991 during the waning days of apartheid rule. While
South Africa's apartheid government may have been primarily motivated to do so by its reluctance to transfer control
of its nuclear weapons to a majority government, it also set the conditions for the successful negotiation of the African
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in 1996.[41]
The Economic Dimension
The South African economy, which is highly diversified, technologically advanced, and capable of generating
substantial amounts of investment capital, dwarfs those of other African states. The foundation of South Africa's
economy is an industrial infrastructure whose manufacturing industries include automobile assembly, metal-working,
machinery and textiles fabrication, and iron and steel production, as well as chemicals, fertilizers, and foodstuffs
(South Africa is the only African state that regularly produces a food surplus). South Africa's modern transportation

infrastructure includes 23,000 of Africa's 42,000 kilometers of railway lines; 58,000 of Africa's 87,000 kilometers of
paved roads; and 5.1 million of Africa's 6 million motor vehicles. South Africa generates 75 percent of the region's
total electrical capacity, and its ports annually handle a tonnage of cargo 16 times greater than that of all others in
Africa combined.[42]
The economies of many Southern African states are dependent on South Africa's transportation system, particularly its
rail network and port facilities. Copper and other mineral exports from the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, for instance,
are shipped primarily through South African ports. The alternative is a longer, more costly, and less reliable route
through Tanzania, whose poorly functioning ports are often clogged with traffic. Mozambique is the only other
Southern African state that can easily export goods through its own ports, which are managed by South African
technicians.[43]
South Africa also has the world's largest reserves, and is a leading producer, of a variety of strategic and industrial
minerals. Its reserves of chrome and manganese ore are the largest found in any single country, and South Africa is the
world's leading producer of alumino-silicates, chrome ore, ferrochromium, gold, and platinum-group metals.[44]
Although South Africa's economy grew at only one percent in 1999, it is projected to increase by six percent over the
next two years. Approximately half of South Africa's economy depends on trade and, while the United States remains
its biggest trading partner ($5.7 billion in 1998), its volume of trade with other African states expanded 20 percent
between 1996 and 1998 to just under $4 billion. South Africa is the primary source of manufactured goods for many
countries in Southern Africa, and the value of South African exports to neighboring countries is four times that of
imports. In 1998, South Africa enjoyed a $2.7 billion trade surplus with other African states.[45]
The end of apartheid and South Africa's membership in SADC have positioned it to serve as the motive force for
economic growth in the region. In keeping with its commitment to regional economic integration, South Africa has
adopted policies to foster more balanced trade relations in Southern Africa. South Africa seeks to coordinate its trade
and economic policies with those of other SADC member states in order to encourage their industrial development and
capacity to export manufactured goods to South African markets. In keeping with this objective, South Africa has
actively directed a number of foreign investment proposals away from its own economy into those of other Southern
African states.[46]
The Military Dimension
Under apartheid South Africa was the dominant military power in Africa, and it remains potentially so today. The
technological basis for South Africa's military superiority over other regional actors is a well-developed militarytechnical base whose capabilities far exceed those of any other African state. Its parastatal Armaments Corporation
(ARMSCOR) and largely privatized subsidiaries provide South Africa with a national military research, development,
and production capability unique in Africa. The export of military equipment also generates substantial amounts of
foreign currency for the South African economy.
In contrast to some of the more idealistic tenets of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign and economic policies, the
leaders of South Africa's defense establishment have remained firm adherents of political realism. Shortly after he
assumed office in 1994, Defense Minister Joe Modise stated, "Peace is the ideal situation, but ideal situations are hard
to find in the real world. The chances of lasting peace are very remote."[47] Later, during debate over South Africa's
first post-apartheid defense budget, Modise told the South African Parliament:
The absence of an immediate threat does not guarantee peace. We have to accept that the future cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty, as international relations are essentially unpredictable [and] are
characterized by national interests competing for trade and natural resources, and in some parts of the
world the disintegration of states through ethnic or religious war.
Modise went on to stress that the South African armed forces are "the nation's insurance policy and the extent of that
insurance depends on what we have invested in it. We do not deserve a second-rate army, navy, or air force." [48]
Under South Africa's new government, the apartheid-era South African Defense Force (SADF) has been reorganized

as the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). Unlike its predecessor, the SANDF is constitutionally
mandated to be a strategically defensive force. The primary roles ascribed to the SANDF by the South African
constitution are to defend the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to "serve in compliance with
international obligations." The SANDF's secondary functions include support to the South African Police Service for
the maintenance of internal security and border control; providing and maintaining essential services for South Africa's
civilian population when required; and "the preservation of life, health, and property; and support for socioeconomic
upliftment." The constitution envisions the SANDF as a "professional, balanced, and modern defense force
representative of all South Africans." Whites-only conscription into South Africa's armed forces ceased on 1 January
1994; the SANDF is now a non-racial, all-volunteer force augmented by reserves (South Africa has the only effective
reserve mobilization system in Africa).[49]
In March 1995 South Africa created a new Department of Defense in order to ensure both effective civilian control of
the armed forces and "transparency in military matters." Establishing a pattern of civil-military relations based on
effective civilian control is of particular importance to South Africa's new political leaders. The South African armed
forces played a key role in keeping the apartheid regime in power. Military autonomy, domestic oppression, and a
wide role in governmental decisionmaking and policy implementation all characterized South African civil-military
relations under the apartheid government.[50]
In this respect, South Africa's senior military leadership has made a political transformation that few observers would
have previously thought possible. With few exceptions, all have gone to great lengths to demonstrate their allegiance to
South Africa's duly constituted civilian government. This commitment to maintaining the integrity of the civilian
government was demonstrated by General Georg Meiring's decision in 1998 to retire as Chief of the SANDF after he
determined that he had lost the confidence of then-President Mandela. In February 1998 Meiring provided Mandela
with an intelligence report indicating that several high-ranking members of the ANC were intentionally working to
destabilize his Government of National Unity. A three-member review commission subsequently found the report to
be without merit. Upon announcing his resignation Meiring said, "The action that resulted from my giving the report
caused certain . . . mistrust. I feel it is my duty to do the honorable thing."[51] Meiring was subsequently replaced by
General Siphiwe Nyanda, formerly commander of the ANC's military wing and, most recently, Chief of the South
African Defense Staff.
The restructuring of South Africa's armed forces also required the integration of all former opponents of the apartheid
government into the SANDF. This contentious process required the integration of 85,000 personnel from the South
African Defense Force with 28,000 from the military wings of the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups, as well as an
additional 10,000 drawn from the so-called "homelands" armies. After screening and "bridging training" under the
observation of a British Military Advisory and Training Team, about 16,000 non-SADF personnel became members of
the SANDF regular force.[52]
Under South Africa's constitution the President appoints the Chief of the National Defense Force, who exercises
operational control over the nation's armed forces. The Chief of the SANDF is responsible to the Defense Minister for
the execution of South Africa's defense policy as stipulated by the Cabinet. The chiefs of South Africa's four military
services (army, navy, air force, and a separately organized medical service) are directly subordinate to the Chief of the
SANDF. Each SANDF component has a role, mission, and functions similar to those of the US military services.
As in the United States following the end of the Cold War, the end of apartheid fostered expectations of a "peace
dividend" in South Africa. High levels of military spending were also incompatible with the government's initial
budgetary priority of funding the Reconstruction and Development Program. The SANDF currently has a strength of
79,700 regular personnel augmented by 386,000 reservists. Current plans envision the reduction of SANDF active-duty
strength to 71,500 over 2001-02. South Africa's 1997 Defense Review proposed an eventual SANDF force structure of
22,000 regular personnel and 69,400 reservists, given the absence of any appreciable external threat. The South
African Defense budget decreased from $3.5 billion for 1992-93 (the last full year of apartheid) to $2.125 billion for
1997-98. The defense budget for 1999-2000 was further reduced to $2 billion in accordance with the government's goal
of limiting defense expenditures to 1.4 percent of South Africa's GDP through at least 2001.[53]
Further reductions in defense spending and force structure are tempered by four factors:

• The requirement to maintain core capabilities which will allow the SANDF to fulfill its primary function. This "core
force concept" seeks to maintain the "minimum viable level" of conventional warfare capabilities to meet short-term
contingencies, ensure the retention of operational and technical expertise, and provide the basis for future
expansion.[54]

• The expectation that substantial numbers of SANDF personnel will continue to augment the South African Police
Service in the conduct of border and internal security operations. Modise identified the primary threat to South Africa
as "that of the instability around us."[55] This threat is characterized by increasing flows of illegal immigrants, drugs,
stolen vehicles, and weapons into South Africa from neighboring states. South Africa has more than 1,200 miles of
land border, much of which is porous or entirely unmarked. Illegal immigration is of particular concern to South
Africa, whose population has been swollen by an estimated one million illegal immigrants from other African
countries. Internally, the greatest threat to South Africa's security is posed by levels of crime and violence that in some
areas have risen beyond the capacity of the police to effectively control.

• The requirement to protect South Africa's maritime interests and marine resources. South Africa is essentially a
maritime nation, and sea-borne trade accounts for 55 percent of the country's GDP. Its location at the southern tip of
Africa gives South Africa a strategic position at a major choke point in the Cape Sea Route linking the Indian and
South Atlantic oceans. The Cape Sea Route is a vital artery of world trade. Forty percent of US and 60 percent of
European oil imports, as well as 25 percent of European food imports, pass around the Cape. South Africa itself is
dependent on the security of the Cape Sea Route for 95 percent of the tonnage and 80 percent of the value of its
imports and exports. South Africa also claims an Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 nautical miles from its
coast.[56]

• The expectation that South Africa will play a prominent role in peace operations and regional defense
cooperation.[57]
Implications for US Regional Security Strategy
Crafting an effective US regional security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa presents several challenges. First, from a
realist perspective, tangible US interests in the region are extremely limited. US economic interests in Africa are
marginal (notwithstanding US oil and mineral imports), and there is no external threat either to these or to the security
of the Cape Sea Route. Nor is there as yet an effective US domestic political constituency for Africa. Second, the
fragmented nature of the African strategic environment offers few opportunities for productive engagement. Finally,
Africans themselves remain mistrustful of foreign involvement in Africa. When outsiders have engaged in the
continent at all, they have usually done so either to extract its resources in the interest of prosperity elsewhere or to
fight proxy wars in whose outcome Africans had little stake.
Accordingly, post-apartheid South Africa's position as the region's pivotal state offers unique prospects for the
attainment of US policy objectives in Africa:

• Support for the continued development of democratic governance and civil society in South Africa should top the list
of US political objectives in Africa. In addition to the moral component, South Africa's peaceful transition to majority
rule provides an "object lesson for other African states that the reconciliation of fundamental issues is possible without
recourse to violence."[58] The election of Thabo Mbeki, who had served as Mandela's Executive Deputy President, to
the South African presidency was largely a foregone conclusion. The real test for democracy in South Africa will come
in 2004 when Mbeki stands for reelection. By then the ANC, always an umbrella political party composed of disparate
groups, is likely to have fragmented and new opposition parties emerged to challenge its political dominance. The
ANC's ability to govern in the presence of effective opposition or to peacefully transfer power as the result of an
electoral defeat will be the real indicator of the success of South Africa's transition to democracy.

• South Africa's nonaligned and Africanist foreign policy provides further opportunities for engagement. South Africa

can serve as a bridge between the West and the nonaligned nations, and its self-defined "African destiny" now allows
South Africa to play a leading role in regional conflict resolution.

• South Africa's continued economic development and its further economic integration with Southern Africa support
US economic policy objectives in Africa, where the prospects for sustainable economic development are otherwise
dim. With the exception of oil imports, the majority of US trade with Africa is with South Africa and other SADC
member states, and Southern Africa already constitutes a regional economic subsystem more than any other part of
Africa. Trade relations are relatively extensive, well-developed transportation and communications link the region
infrastructures, particularly those of South Africa, and labor has historically migrated from other Southern African
states to South Africa.

• The development of regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms is unlikely to be fully effective
without South African participation. No other African state is capable of deploying and sustaining its armed forces
beyond its borders for any appreciable length of time. The SANDF could play a key role in African peacekeeping
forces, particularly by providing transportation, communications, and logistical support.
Africa's problems are many, US resources are limited, and opportunities for productive engagement in the region are
few. As this analysis suggests, a regional security strategy predicated on furthered, deepened engagement with South
Africa as the region's pivotal state offers the most effective means of achieving US policy objectives in Africa. The
objective of such a strategy is not the creation of a US "deputy" for Africa, but rather support for a stable, democratic
partner capable of exercising regional political, economic, and, if need be, military leadership.
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